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COMPANY LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: II t
IV.
The principal concern of the Latin American legislators
has been to secure the integrity of the capital, in order to
protect creditors and investors, and to adopt measures which
will protect minority shareholders. It is with these charac-
teristics of the statutes that we shall now deal. The two
problems are interrelated and no sharp delimitation can
be drawn.
Foreign writers criticize our law for not paying sufficient
attention to the policy of preserving the integrity of the capi-
tal. In some respects, it is true that we may fall short of the
strict requirements which the Latin American laws exact
to control watered stock. In others, our practice is superior,
and I am inclined to think these foreign criticisms are based
on old books rather than on the present state of our law.
All the laws, like our own, contain prohibitions against
the declaration of dividends, or other devices of distribution,
except out of surplus net profits; but our prohibitions are
more effective in practice." 6
The principle securing the integrity of the capital is
carried to an extreme in those statutes that prohibit any de-
crease of the capital stock. A corporation charter in Colombia
cannot be amended to decrease the capital. 6 The pending
Colombian draft recognizes the disadvantage of this drastic
rule and permits reduction of capital provided notice has
been given to creditors and approval of the Superintendent
t This is the second of two installments of this article. The first appeared
in the Fall issue of Volume XXVII of the Notre Dame Lawyer. Limitations of
space and the general inaccessibility of foreign material have rendered it inad-
visable to attempt to cite authority for every assertion of fact and law; several
are based on the author's practical experience and accordingly he invites the
reader to accept him on faith. [Editor's note].
105 The prohibition against illegal dividends is illusory. 1 RlvAoLA, SociE-
DADES A ONflAs 24 (1935).
106 Decree 2521 of 1950, art. 29.
(223)
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of Share Companies has been obtained. °7 The pending pro-
vision in effect follows the Chilean law which provides that
all amendments of the charter are subject to authorization
of the President of the Republic."0 8
In Guatemala notice of a proposed reduction must be
given to creditors by publication and they may file objections
with the Finance Minister."0 9 In Venezuela reduction of
capital is not effective until three months after the publica-
tion, pursuant to court order, of the shareholders' resolution
in the Official Gazette. This publication must include a
notice stating that any creditor may oppose it by court
action during the three months. Stockholders must exercise
their opposition by court action within fifteen days after
initial publication.'"
Some statutes prohibit a corporation from buying its own
shares, even out of surplus profits. In Mexico, this is abso-
lutely prohibited, except on a judicial sale for the collection
of a debt due to the company."' In other countries, it is
permitted if approved by the corporation bureaus."'
In Guatemala, no company may invest more than 25%
of its capital in other companies, unless either authorized
in the charter or consented to by all its creditors and by the
government. In any event the maximum is 50%."
The balance sheet is considered of major importance to
evidence the integrity of the capital and the statutes and
regulations generally contain copious provisions for its form-
ulation, audit, modification, approval or rejection by the
107 Articles 47-9 and Exposicion de Motivos, 3 REvIsrA Tam. DE DEREcHO
ComERciAL No. 12-13, 67 (1949).
108 CODE Or COmlERCE art. 427.
109 CODE or ComERcE art. 392 (1943).
310 MORALFS, Estumios JuRmIcos 99, 103 (1943). See CODIGO DE COMRCIo
arts. 227, 295 (1944).
111 General Law of Mercantile Companies, art. 133.
112 E.g., Chile: Resolution of the Superintendent, July 7, 1931. See CASTRO
OssANDoN, JURISPRUDENCIA ADmImEISTRATIVA DE LAS SOCIEDADES ANONimAS 26
(1950).
113 CODIGo DE ComERcio art. 333 (1942).
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shareholders." 4 There is generally a provision forbidding
directors to vote at shareholders' meetings on matters re-
lating to the balance sheet or on other matters affecting
their liability. Consonant with this are frequent prohibitions
against managers, directors or auditors holding proxies."'
These prohibitions seem wholly unrealistic; our own practice
is to the contrary.
The antipathy 'to no-par value stock also seems to be
connected with the feeling that it is incompatible with the
policy insuring the integrity of the capital and the formula-
tion of true balance sheets. They are generally prohibited
by the affirmative requirement that shares must state the
par value." 6 Shares without par value are not authorized
save in Chile, Mexico and Panama; even there they are not
favored for no corporation has been organized in Chile in
this form and only a very few family corporations are to be
found in Mexico. They are generally condemned by the
commentators. The Chilean provision 117 authorizing no-par
shares is described as an ill-conceived provision introduced
at the last moment, contemplating a situation infrequent in
Chile and extraneous to the local idiosyncrasy and legal
organization." 8 It has also been said that the attempt to
naturalize this foreign institution, which is without Mexican
tradition or antecedents and contrary to all norms of Euro-
pean and Latin American corporation law, has not been
successful in Mexico.'"
114 AscARLLrI, PROBLEMAS DAS SociEDADEs ANONIMAS 353 (1945). Ascarelli
and other commentators stress the principle of the integrity of the capital;
e.g., 2 GAY DE MONTEmLA, TRATADO PRAcTico DE SOCxEDADS MERCANTms 49
et seq., 56 (1947).
115 E.g., Argentina: CODE or Co1mnc art. 355 (Wilson-Rae's transl. 1904).
Brazil: Decree Law of 1940, art. 96. Honduras: CommcAL CODE art. 152 (1950).
Venezuela: CODIGODE Co~mmcIo art. 290 (1944).
116 E.g., Guatemala: CODIGO DFs Commclo art. 395 (1942).
117 Decree Law 251 of 1931, art. 117 (a).
118 2 OrAvAmm AvLA, MANUAL DE DER=HO CodA Rcssz 157 (1950).
119 1 RODRIGUEz RODRiGUEZ, TRATADO DE SOCMDAms MERCANTiLES 340 et seq.
(1947).
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One feature common to all the corporation laws is the
minute regulation of auditors. Theoretically, the auditors,
called by an amazing variety of names (sindico, comisario,
revisor fiscal, Junta de Vigilancia, etc.), have far wider
powers than our own auditors. Their right of inspection is
generally unlimited, extending to all corporate transac-
tions, 20 and they have a right to convoke shareholders'
meetings.
Our system of independent auditors, imposed by practice,
or by the requirements of bank credit and stock exchange
regulations, is in reality more effective. The fact that the
auditors are appointed by the board of directors does not
make the audit less effective. In England they are appointed
by the general meeting of shareholders and regulated by
statute.
121
Appointment of auditors by the shareholders is the uni-
versal statutory rule in Latin America. The Spanish Code of
Commerce of 1885 (which is followed in Peru and is law
in Cuba) contains no provision as to auditors, but the ap-
plicable controls are rooted in practice.'22 In some countries
they must be shareholders.
The Argentine sindicos or auditors, in practice, furnish
no protection to the shareholders and limit themselves to
certifying that the balance sheet is in conformity with the
account books. Audit by the State is said to be equally
ineffective.
2 3
In Chile, similarly, all the auditors do is certify that they
have compared the balance sheet with the ledger. They can
examine business transacted only within their term of office
120 E.g., Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles 166 (IX).
121 PALMER, ComPANY LAW (19th ed., Topham, 1949). Auditors in England
are now fully regulated by the Companies Act., 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 134.
122 1 RoDRIGUEz RODRiGUEZ, op. cit. spra note 119, at 179.
123 Rojo CARDENAS, CONTRALOR POR EL ESTADO DE SociDADs A1oNONAS 66,
67, 111 (1950). See also, De Sola Canizares, Les Societes Commerciales en Ameri-
que Latine, 2 CAMIERS DE LEGISLATON ET DE BIBLIOGRAPHIE JURIDIQUES DE
LAIERIQUE LATINE, No. 5, 184 (1950).
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and cannot pass on future plans or call for technical reports
received by the directors. 24
In Mexico, practice falls far short of the theoretical con-
ceptions and legislative ideal; the auditors are of little sig-
nificance in the daily life of corporations.'25
In the more recent legislation, the auditors may be either
natural persons, partnerships or corporations. Trust com-
panies in Mexico may be auditors. 26 But a corporation
in the Argentine cannot be appointed sindico. The obsolete
notion that only natural persons can be subjects of penal
liability, that corporations, having no soul, cannot be guilty
of a crime, dies hard in doctrinal writings in South Ameri-
ca 12 despite the practical realities.
A Mexican provision seems a wise one: a minority repre-
senting 25% of the shares has the right to appoint one of
the auditors. 2 ' This principle was followed in the Brazilian
law. There, a minority representing at least one-fifth of the
capital has the right to elect one member of the auditing
committee. The holders of preferred stock as a group have
a similar right.'2 9
On the whole the prevention of watered stock has been
more successful. The issuance of shares for services is fre-
quently prohibited. In lieu of shares, provision is made in
some of the statutes for certificates of participation in the
124 2 OTAvARUA AVILA, op. cit. supra note 118, No. 262, p. 166 (1950),
citing Resolution of the Superintendency, Oct. 21, 1936.
125 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 119, at 183. This accords
fully with my own observations. Micou also noted that throughout Latin America,
auditors are frequently mere whitewashing agencies. Micou, Corporate Financing
under Latin American Law: A Comparative Study, 22 CoRNEL L. Q. 490, 505
(1937). Of course, there are numerous well managed companies whose accounting
and auditing procedures (frequently by British or American firms) are up to the
highest standards, but this is due to the directors, not the stockholders.
126 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 119, at 186; Ley de Opera-
ciones e Instituciones de Credito, art. 44 (c).
127 E.g., Jimenez de Asua, La cuestion de la responsabilidad penal de las
personas juridfcas, 5 REvrSTA TmM. DE DERECHO COmmRCmA Nos. 18-19, 39 (1950).
128 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 119, at 188; Ley General de
Sociedades Mercantiles arts. 144, 171 (1932).
129 De Sola Canizares, supra note 123, citing article 125 of the 1940 law.
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profits (acciones de industria, acciones de trabajo) which
however, must be left on deposit with the company until
the contract for services is completed,13 1 or otherwise they
are not transferable.' To remunerate promoters, who in
former days were styled "the destroyers, not the founders"
of the company because of their grasping for exorbitant ad-
vantages, founders' shares are provided for in a number of
statutes with varying restrictions. Generally, they are limited
to a share in profits not to exceed 10% for a fixed term of
5 or 10 years. This is current practice in Bolivia and Mexico.
Where stock is issued as consideration for property, elabo-
rate safeguards are provided. In the Argentine, the Inspector
of Corporations (Inspeccion de Justicia) usually demands
evidence that the value is real and not exaggerated. 32 In
Colombia, the Superintendent of Share Companies inter-
venes in fixing the value and this valuation on organi-
zation, must be unanimously accepted by the incorporators.
Later contributions require a 75% vote and the owner of
the property which is to be turned in cannot vote. The
Superintendent can call for appropriate evidence of the real
value or appoint appraisers at the expense of the company or
owners. 3 In Brazil, property must be valued by three
appraisers, but this is unnecessary when it belongs in com-
mon to all the shareholders. 4 In Venezuela, any share-
holder may ask for an appraisal and the contributor, if
already a stockholder, may not vote for acceptance of the
property contributed.' 3 5
The Dominican Republic requires approval of the valua-.
tion at two meetings of the shareholders, at which the con-
130 E.g., Bolivia: De Sola Canizares, supra note 123, at 208, citing Decree of
March 8, 1860.
131 Guatemala: CODIOO DE ComRciO art. 396 (1942), borrowed from the
Mexican law, Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles art. 114 (1932), and originally
from France. They have not taken root in Mexico. 1 RODRIGUEz RoDraiGuEz, op. cit.
supra note 119, at 353 et seq.
132 MARVE & O'FARRELL, MEMORANDUM ON Co.PANY LAw 1 (3d ed. 1951).
133 Decree 2521 of 1950, arts. 31-34.
134 De Sola Canizares, supra note 123, at 198, citing arts. 5, 6, Decree of 194Q.
135 CODE OF ComERcE art. 261 (1942).
COMPANY LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
tributors of the property may not vote. 3 ' In Guatemala, the
property must be itemized in full and appraised in the arti-
cles of association or in an inventory previously accepted by
the incorporators. 37 Even then, the appraisals are subject
to approval by the Department of Finance.
In Honduras the property must be transferred to a trustee
before incorporation of the company, to be delivered to
it after completion of the organization. The shares received
in return for the property must remain on deposit with the
company for two years. If during that time it appears that
the property was worth less, by 25%, than the value stated,
the contributing shareholder must pay the difference in
cash. The company meanwhile has a lien on the shares de-
posited superior to the rights of any other creditors. 3 ' This
provision, save for the initial part providing for a trustee,
was taken from article 141 of the Mexican Law. In the
Exposition of Motives accompanying this provision, the
Executive of Mexico stated:
No one is ignorant of the fact that such contributions [of
property] are at the present time one of the readiest exped-
ients to which promoters resort to defraud the public. The
Executive believes that by denying temporarily the negoti-
ability of the certificates which represent such contributions
and imposing the duty of paying the difference which may
appear, when this difference should be deemed logically to
exceed natural errors of valuation, this danger is greatly
limited.
This two year inalienability device is also found in the
pending Colombian draft.'39 It has been stated however,
that a similar provision in Chile 140 has been evaded in
practice.
141
136 TELLADo, LAS SociADEs ComERcIALEss EN LA REPUBLICA DOm2IICANA
80, 132 (1939). This work is based chiefly on French decisions.
137 CODIGO DE CommRcio art. 282 (1942).
138 CODIGO DE CommEcIo art. 96 (1950).
139 Article 24 and Exposicion de Motivos, 3 RmvsTA RTa. DE DERECHO
COMERCIAL, 61 (1949).
140 Decree Law 251 of May 31, 1931, art. 95.
141 H.RERA REYES, SocxnDADEs ANONniAS 26 (1935). He attributes the
difficulty to defective draftsmanship.
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In the attempt to protect the minority shareholders
against the majority, artificial restrictions, annoying and
generally ineffective, have been imposed on voting rights.
The latest of these is the Colombian law which provides that
no shareholder may directly or indirectly vote more than
2 5% of the stock represented at the meeting.142 In Argentina
no shareholder may represent more than one-tenth of the
votes conferred by all the outstanding shares nor more than
two-tenths of the votes present at the meeting.'43 In Uruguay
no one may represent more than six votes if the company
is formed of 100 shares or more, nor more than three if
it is formed of a lesser number.
144
It is possible that these restrictions may account for the
popularity of bearer shares still prevalent in Argentina and
Uruguay, though they are tending to disappear elsewhere.
The introduction of bearer shares is attributed to John
Law. 4 ' It has been said that the origin of the principle of
limited liability in stock companies was due to the adoption
of bearer shares.'46 This hypothesis seems intrinsically pro-
bable and is reinforced by comparison with the evolution
of the common law. Bearer shares apparently never entered
into commercial usage in England, possibly because the
courts refused to apply the merchants' concepts of negotia-
bility.
The absorption of the Law Merchant was one of the
advantageous triumphs of the common law. We have thereby
avoided some of the needless complexities with which con-
tinental (excluding Swiss, Italian, Scandinavian and, to a
lesser extent, Dutch law) and Latin American law are still
plagued. The difference between common ("civil") law and
142 Law 58 of 1931, art. 29, is embodied, with additions, in the compilation
Decree 2521 of 1950, art. 90 et seq.
143 CODE OF COMMERCE art. 350 (Wilson-Rae's transl. 1904)
144 MARvEL & O'FARRELL, MEMORANDUM ON COMPANY LAW OF URUGUAY
(1951), citing Commercial Code, art. 420.
145 1 AscARELLI, op. cit. supra note 114, at 338 n. 14.
146 2 GAY DE MoNTELLA, op. cit. supra note 114, at 34.
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commercial law is one of these complexities. The Law Mer-
chant was not fully followed by our courts of common law
and equity. They purported to take it over only to the
extent that it did not conflict with what were thought to be
fundamental principles of the common law. This restriction
narrowed the scope of its usefulness. It required the Statute
of Anne to correct the refusal of the courts to recognize the
negotiability of promissory notes, and as late as 1832 a
note payable to bearer was held to be non-negotiable." 7
The general principle of negotiability was not, and is not
to this day, fully recognized. We still speak of quasi-negotia-
bility. In foreign law, shares are negotiable instruments in
the fullest sense.14 The principle of the partnership as an
entity, recognized by the Law Merchant, has only partially
entered our law; and finally, in what here concerns us, the
fundamental principles of the corporate structure as evolved
by the Law Merchant were not recognized by our courts.
The limitation of liability of shareholders required a long
legislative struggle. We have not yet overcome the concep-
tion that corporate personality and limited liability are a
gracious gift from the State. This obsolete theory should be
replaced by the more reasonable and factual principle of the
Law Merchant that they are inherent and necessary attri-
butes of a stock company, not flowing from any royal, sover-
eign or legislative grant.
Bearer shares can only be issued for fully-paid stock.149
Other limitations on their issue have become increasingly
frequent. These restrictions have a two-fold purpose: to
prevent ownership by aliens in industries or activities re-
stricted to nationals, and to prevent evasion of income and
inheritance taxes. Restriction of ownership to nationals is
effected by article 160 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1946,
147 Bradley v. Trammel, 3 Fed. Cas. 1168, No. 1,788a (Super. Ct. Ark. 1832).
148 AscARFaLU, op. cit. supra note 114, at 343.
149 A few countries permit shares to bearer when 50% of the subscription
has been paid.
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prohibiting newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting
companies from issuing bearer shares,' and in Mexico by
similar statutory provisions which accomplish the same pur-
pose. 5' In Brazil, no company issuing bearer shares may do
business without listing on the stock exchange.' 52 A manifes-
tation of the desire to prevent evasion of taxes is a Peruvian
law 153 under which "family corporations" can issue only
registered (nominative) shares. 5 ' Uruguay has very neatly
solved the tax problems connected with bearer shares. All
stock companies pay a yearly tax on shares issued to bearer,
in lieu of death duties, which amounts to 534 % on the de-
clared capital. In the event of the death of the holder, there
is no estate tax payable on the shares. This is a great advant-
age, especially if the heirs reside abroad, since the surtax on
inheritance for non-residents is double the basic amount. It
has therefore become common for wealthy families to or-
ganize their fortunes as stock companies.
Uruguay is an oasis in a fear-swept world. It is one of the
few genuine democracies in Latin America and is noted for
its political and economic tranquility. Its tax system is one
of the most lenient in South America. Uruguay passed a law
on June 24, 1948, covering investment companies which has
been commonly, but erroneously, referred to as the Holding
Law. Its purpose was to encourage incorporation in Uruguay
for portfolio investments abroad (i.e., outside of Uruguay).
Investments in Uruguay itself by such companies are subject
to certain restrictions, but the tax imposed, in substitution
of the estate and all other taxes, is only 3 %.11 The law con-
tains other interesting provisions which we cannot go into
here.
150 THE CONSTITUTION or THE AmERiCAS 96 (Fitzgibbon ed. 1948).
151 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 119, at 369.
152 Decree Law 9783 of Sept. 6, 1946.
153 Law 8548 of June 17, 1937.
154 LEON MONTALBAN, DERECHO COMERCIAL 321 (1943).
155 MAR VEL & O'FARRELL, op. cit. supra note 144. For a detailed study of
Uruguayan corporation law, see TASSINO, SOCiEDADE S AuONImAS (2d ed. 1944).
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Another protection common in Latin America and accord-
ed to dissident shareholders is the right of withdrawal and
reimbursement for their shares in case of major changes
in the corporate structure, such as change of object, assess-
ments, issue of preferred stock, merger or consolidation.156
The amount payable is determined by the value of the
shares pursuant to the last balance sheet. This contrasts un-
favorably with our own law in analogous cases in that it
ignores market value, hidden reserves and the future pros-
pects of the company. On the other hand, it avoids the
expense and delay of our appraisals under court action. The
Latin American provisions had their origin in the Italian
Commercial Code of 1882. The statutes create doubt as to
whether the right can be waived by a by-law provision, but
the prevalent opinion is that it cannot. 57 The courts do not
appear to have been sympathetic in their interpretation of
the statutes 158 and the right of withdrawal is rarely availed
of, even less than in the United States.
Only in recent years have attempts been made to effec-
tively impose liability on managers and directors. In many
jurisdictions, their absolution from liability granted by the
shareholders' meeting is still final. Moreover, the usual pro-
vision that they cannot vote at shareholders' meetings on
questions affecting their liability is, of course, ineffective.
In Argentina, the rigid rule that directors cannot contract
directly or indirectly with the company "I is based on public
policy and strictly interpreted. In one case a mortgage exe-
156 Argentina: CommEiRc_ ConE, art. 354. Brazil: Decree Law 1940, art. 107.
Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, art. 206. Uruguay: 1909 law.
Venezuela: CommRCIAL CODE, art. 287 (1942) (does not apply to increase of
capital by issuance of new shares). See AscARELI, op. cit. supra note 114 at 421
et seq.
157 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ op. cit. sura note 119, at 549 et seq. See
CASTRO NovAREs, MANUAL DE SOCIEDADES ANOaaiAs No. 519, p. 304 (1941):
citing a decision of the Inspeccion de Justicia, June 5, 1924. The new Civil Code
of Italy, art. 2437 (1942), settles the doubt by prescribing that the right cannot
be waived or exercise of it rendered more onerous.
158 CASTRO NovAR.s, op. cit. supra note 157, at 454 et seq., 474.
159 Co arMmERciAL CoDE, art. 338.
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cuted by the corporation in favor of the wife of a director
was held void and not cured by a subsequent confirmation
at the shareholders' meeting.' It has also been held that
absolution (quietus) by the shareholders' meeting does not
prevent an individual shareholder from suing a director for
misconduct.' In Peru, since the directors are agents, they
cannot contract with the company, and any shareholder has
the right to demand an accounting.' 82 In Chile, by-laws
restricting the liability of managers and directors are pro-
hibited.1 3 The law in Brazil does not prohibit directors from
dealing with the company, but they must advise the other
directors of their conflicting interest and abstain from
voting. 4 The Colombian prohibition against a director deal-
ing in the shares of the company - unless he has special
authorization of the board and unless he does so for non-
speculative reasons - with its drastic penalty requiring for-
feiture of all his shares in favor of the company, has given
rise to absurd results. It is avoided in practice by dummies,
and the penalty is evaded by the director when he sells all
his shares.
65
The theory underlying these rules as expressed in the
Argentine Code and nearly all the other codes is that the
directors or managers are agents (mandatarios) subject to
fiduciary duties; but in the absence of a doctrine analogous
to our constructive trust, the theoretical remedies against
them are often ineffective. The remedies offered by the codes
are seldom applied in practice, and there is no effective pro-
160 Rojo CARDENAs, op. cit. supra note 123, at 155, citing Camara Civil 2a.
Capital, Junio 27, 1939, 68 JURISPRUDEZCiA ARGENTINA 126; 15 LA LEY 340.
161 Id. at 158, citing Camara Comercial Capital, Nov. 9, 1921, 7 JUass-
PRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 471.
162 LEON MONTALBAN, op. cit. supra note 154, at 304; Valle v. Navas, 41
ANALEs JuDicIALEs 43 (Supreme Court, March 27, 1945).
163 De Sola Canizares, supra note 123, at 210 et seq., citing art. 4, Decree
Law of Nov. 30, 1946.
164 Ibid., citing art. 120, Law of 1940.
165 Exposicion de Motivos, 3 REviSTA TRIM. DE DEmECHO COMERCIAL 81
(1949).
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tection for shareholders.'66 In Chile, on the other hand, an
advocate of the Superintendency of Share Companies claims
that its intervention on behalf of shareholders is beneficial
and effective and that while it acts with moderation and dis-
cretion to avoid alarm in the securities market, it is never-
theless sufficiently energetic to maintain its prestige. 67
The commission that prepared the pending draft in Colom-
bia came to the conclusion, after protracted deliberation,
that administrative regulation would be more effective than
judicial control.'68
The underlying concept that the directors are agents of
the company and of the majority of the shareholders, is
different from that underlying our law. With us, the directors
are entrusted generally with the control and management
of the business of the corporation. Their authority is absolute
so long as they act within the law. Only in a limited sense
can they be considered agents. The powers of our board of
directors are original and undelegated. They are derivative
- not from the shareholders as in Latin America - only in
the sense that they are received from the State in the act of
incorporation.' 69 Our concept that directors have the duties
and liabilities of trustees is more fruitful than the more
restricted concept of agency found in Latin American law
and offers solution of many problems of corporate life.1
7
1
Before attempting a forecast of future developments in
Latin American law, it will be useful to ascertain from some
166 INSUA RODRIGUEZ, BASES PARA LA REORMA DEL CODIGO DE COZIERCIO
ECUATORIANO 43 (1942), referring to the duty of the Commercial Judge (art.
322 of the Commercial Code) to supervise corporate operations.
167 CAsTio OsNDoN, op. cit. supra note 112, at 6.
168 Exposicion de Motivos, 3 REVISTA TRimi. DE DERECHo Co0&ERCIAL 81
(1949).
169 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. (2d) 829 (1945);
2 FLL7CHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 505 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1931). One conse-
quence of the Latin-American theory that directors are agents is reflected in the
custom in Argentina to enumerate in detail the grants of ordinary powers to the
board of directors. This is necessitated by the lengthy and minute requirements
of the Civil Code in the chapter on agency.
1to Eder, La reforma de la sociedad anonima espanola, 26 REVISTA DE DERECHO
MERcANTL 261 (1950).
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random statistics how far corporate development has already
progressed. A capital market exists in only a few coun-
tries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico; and to a
lesser extent in Uruguay, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela.
In Cuba, investors and speculators are more interested in
the New York Stock Exchange than in local securities.
Over 200 companies with a capital of over three billion
pesos were listed on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange at the
close of 1949. The total number of shares traded in 1949 was
2,810,313 (a drop from over 5,000,000 in 1948). Seventy-
one companies had preferred stock. Exclusive of mortgage
bank issues, only 10 company bond issues were traded in. 7 '
In Brazil, in 1946, there were 4428 corporations with a total
invested capital of over 28 billion cruzeiros, the most impor-
tant being banks and finance companies. 2 On the Rio de
Janeiro Stock Exchange in 1950, there were transactions in
shares of about 40 banks, 25 insurance, 14 textile, 9 trans-
port and 118 miscellaneous companies. Only 16 issues of
preferred stocks and bonds of only 15 companies (exclusive
of two mortgage bank issues) were traded in. In spite of the
high interest rate, ranging from 5% to 9%, many of these
bond issues were quoted considerably below par.17 3
In Chile in 1948, there were 709 stock companies with
an authorized capital of 172 billion pesos and a paid-up
capital of 15 billion pesos.' 74 In Colombia in 1944, there were
943 stock companies, of which 842 were national and 101
foreign, with a paid-up capital and surplus of 356 million
pesos and 221 million pesos, respectively.'75 In 1950, about
171 Bolsa de Cornercio de Buenos Aires. Memoria 1949 (1950).
172 0 LIVRO DAS SOCIEDADES ANONIMAS BRAsumrmnAs (1946).
173 Movimiento da Bolsa durante o anno de 1950. Bolsa de Valores, Rio de
Janeiro, Jan. 25, 1951.
174 OLVARRiA AviLA, op. cit. supra note 118, at 129.
'75 COLOMBIA EN CiPRS 344 (1944). The capital investment in both cate-
gories has increased tremendously since that date. The only private bond issue of
importance is that of an electric company.
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100 company shares were actively traded in on the Bogota
Stock Exchange, but there were only a few private bond
issues.
In Mexico, as of May 30, 1950, the shares of 149 banking,
insurance and other credit or finance companies, 70 indus-
trial companies (of which 34 had preferred stock), and
seven mining companies were listed on the Mexico City
exchange. In contrast to other countries, bond issues are of
substantial importance; excluding mortgage bank bonds,
about 78 companies had listed bond issues. There is a stock
exchange also in Monterrey. A great many stock companies,
especially banks and finance companies have been organized
which are not listed on the exchanges. For example, the total
number of insurance companies is 66; banks, trust com-
panies, etc., 269; and auxiliary finance companies, 105.118
V.
As to the future, generalizations are dangerous, prophe-
cies more so, but I venture to draw the following conclusions.
1. There will be progressively less inclination to copy
foreign models and future legislation will be based more on
preliminary studies of the realities of home life, experience
and mercantile usages.
As we showed at the beginning of this article, there was
sufficient experience prior to independence on which to
build up a body of well adapted corporate law. The well-
grounded inheritance of Portuguese, Spanish and colonial
law should not have been ignored by the legislatures, as it
was, in their search for an ideal law. Nor should the practices
developed largely under British influence have been dis-
carded. There is always danger when foreign statutes are
copied without regard to local conditions and without due
integration into the traditional legal system of a country.
176 10 ANUARIO FINANCIERO DE MEXICO 1949 1034 et seq., 1203 (1950).
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This defect has been conspicuous in Latin America. It is
now being appreciated.' 77
True to Spanish form, the legislature has often been tilt-
ing at windmills. It has had its eye on abuses abroad which
never existed and were unlikely at home. They have "legis-
lated in the air and hence done more harm than good." The
pronouncements of bureaucrats and politicians to the con-
trary, corporate practices have been relatively clean and
compare favorably with more "advanced" countries. Es-
pecially in well-knit small communities, where people know
one another, the pressure of public opinion is more effective
than paper statutes.
Such a phenomenon as Argentinismo has its good side. It
is in part a healthy reaction to the subservience in the past
to foreign law. The fundamental changes in the life and law
of nations must come from within, from the initiative and
efforts of the people themselves. Foreign legislation, servile-
ly imitated, has been harmfully influential in the outward
aspect of Latin American legislation. In many cases, the
result has been a veneer, rootless, ill-digested and frus-
trating.
2. As surplus capital increases and investments in real
estate due to high prices become less attractive, more in-
vestment capital will become available for corporations and
capital markets will be built up. There will be a tendency
towards preferred stock and more favorable legislation to
promote bond issues.
I have deemed it unnecessary to discuss preferred stock
and bond issues, since the subject has been well covered in
previous articles by other authors, and few changes have
been made in the law since their publication. 7 ' The legisla-
177 This is evidenced to some extent in the Mexican and Brazilan legislation;
in the pending draft in Spain, REvrsTA DE DEaEcHO MERCANTIL, VoL IX, No. 26,
Marzo-Abril 1950; in 1 RavARoxA, op. cit. supra note 105, at 11 et seq.; in Rojo
CARDENAS, op. cit. supra note 123; and in De Sola Canizares, supra note 123, at 17
178 Schoenrich, Corporate Bond Issues in Latin America, 9 TuANE L. REV.
199 (1935); Micou, supra note 125; Voelkel, A Comparative Study of the Laws oi
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tion as to bond issues was designed originally to facilitate
'placing issues abroad, rather than for domestic use. Only
mortgage bank bonds have really taken root heretofore.
3. The tendency in the modern statutes and drafts to
differentiate between big business and small business and to
restrict the corporate form to the former will be acceler-
ated." 9 The latter is well provided for in the limited liability
firm, which ranges from a true partnership to an organization
closely resembling a corporation and which has become in-
creasingly popular because of the cumbersomeness and ex-
pense of the corporate form and its subjection to govern-
ment control."80
There is also a tendency to differentiate between corpora-
tions privately financed and those which appeal to the public
for funds. The former are in practice already largely left
alone by' the corporation bureaus even when they have the
right of control. Some of the statutes expressly make this
differentiation, as do our own blue sky laws and the securi-
ties and exchange acts. This is true in Mexico, where a
securities and exchange commission was set up in 1939; the
present name is Comision Nacional de Valores and it is gov-
erned by Decree of February 11, 1946.
4. Bearer shares will be eliminated or die out in practice.
They have ceased to exist in many countries even where
permitted. The many restrictions on their issue in the present
Latin America Governing Foreign Business Corporations, 14 TULANE L. REv. 42
(1940). There has been some improvement in the law in Brazil, Colombia, Peru
and the Dominican Republic. For later literature, see PFaANo FAcio, DR Los
E INRESTITOS DE LAS SOcIEDADES ANoNimAs, POR EaslION DE OBLIGACIONES NEGO-
CIABLES (DEBENTURES) (1943); 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 119.
179 De Sola Canizares, Le critere de la dimension dans les societes commer-
dales, 3 REVUE TRMESTRELLE DE DRoIT COMmERcaAL, 364, 371 (1950). See also
the pending Spanish draft, REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL (Marzo-Abril 1950).
180 See Eder, Limited Liability Firms Abroad, 13 U. OF PiTr. L. REV. 193
(1952).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
laws have been pointed out. The Superintendency in Chile
has always been adverse to them.'.8 Ecuador by law of July
28, 1948, prohibited bearer shares; they were practically
non-existent before. The pending Colombian draft proposes
their abolition; they already have tended to disappear.
The Latin American countries have become fully alive to
the dangers resulting where vital enterprises are controlled
by foreigners, especially in event of war or financial crisis.
The elimination of bearer shares is believed to be a safe-
guard.' 82
5. The courts will tend to provide the substantial equiva-
lent of equitable remedies to protect stockholders against
abuses of management. With increased confidence in the
courts, the exorbitant powers of administrative authorities
will be pared down.' Possibly, government intervention
has reached its peak.
Few of these countries have or can develop an efficient
civil service capable of satisfactorily tackling the task of
government supervision they have assumed. It will doubtless
be found in the course of time that legislative and adminis-
trative interferences, because so numerous and extreme,
181 2 OLAVARRIA AviLA, op. cit. supra note 118, at 129 n. 1.
182 Rojo CA ENAs, op. cit. supra note 123, at 10 et seq. This author strongly
opposes bearer shares, id. at 20 et seq.; but he is in error in supposing that regis-
tered shares necessarily tend to restrict speculation. Moreover, speculation is an
essential to building up capital markets. 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Op. Cit. supra
note 119, is also inclined to look unfavorably on bearer shares.
183 There are surprisingly few cases in the reports on fundamental questions
of corporation law. In those countries where government control is strong, the
living corporation law is to be sought not so much in court decisions as in the
rulings of the corporation bureaus. Digests of these decisions have been published
recently in Chile, CASTRO OSSAnDON, op. cit. supra note 112; and in Colombia,
DOCTRINAs, 6 REVISTA DE LA SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADEs ANONIMAS No. 18,
(Dec. 1949). The paucity of decisions in Uruguay is attributed to the provision
of the Commercial Code (art. 511) for arbitration. Informe sobre la Legislacion
Uruguaya Vigente 46 (1947).
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have undermined the confidence essential to trade and in-
dustry and have impaired, if not destroyed, credit.
There is already an increasing appreciation that no sta-
tutory regulation of an institution in as constant change and
evolution as the stock company can be perfect, and that the
courts aided by doctrinal writings must necessarily play an
increasingly important role.'84
The strictness of the corporation statutes has eliminated
resort to the doctrine allowing the corporate veil to be
pierced. But to prevent fraud, it will doubtless be applied
when needed.' There has been a growing tendency on the
part of the courts, in order to curb domination by the ma-
jority and abuses by the directorate, to apply principles
preventing abuse of rights and to interpret the social contract
in the light of the requirements of good faith.
6. Concurrently, as industrial corporations increase in
magnitude, there will be, on the part of the directors and
officers, an ever growing sense of fiduciary responsibility.
Generalization here is impossible so much do the different
countries and even regions of the same country differ in
ethnic, geographical, historical, political, economic and other
sociological matters. Laxity in enforcement of the criminal
law in general is characteristic of many of the countries.
Realistic legislation should reckon with this factor and place
little reliance on the effectiveness of penal sanctions in the
corporation laws. More faith can be placed on a sound public
opinion backed up by the civil courts.
7. The cumbersome procedures for incorporation will be
simplified and many artificial restrictions now found in
company laws will be eliminated.
184 E.g., Rojo CARDENAS op. cit. supra note 123, at 2.
185 ASCARELLI, op. cit. supra note 114, at 541 et seq., advocates it. He cites
a Brazilian case where a corporation made up of doctors, prohibited by law
from operating pharmacies, was declared illegal.
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8. The board of directors will be vested with greater
inherent powers and the present supreme authority of the
general shareholders' meeting correspondingly pared down.
9. The present general rigor of the law as to nullity of
corporations for failure to comply strictly with technical
formalities of organization will be modified. The Dominican
law 1145 provides that nullity cannot be enforced if the
defect has disappeared, and in any event there is a statutory
limitation of three years. Persons who acquire shares cannot
invoke a nullity when the ground for it existed prior to their
acquisition. 6 In Mexico, a company cannot be declared void
after registry, unless its purpose or business prove to be
illegal. The pending Colombian draft provides that once a
corporation has been authorized by the Superintendent to
do business, there can be no nullity.'87
10. The basic concepts of our express trust will be
adopted and adapted to the civil law and will be availed of
especially in the field of corporate activities. The express
trust has been incorporated into Panamanian and Mexican
law. In Mexico trust companies play an important part in
business life. Argentina, Brazil and some other countries
have adopted, in part, the corporate trustee. 8
Our law contains many suggestions for fruitful study by
Latin Americans. Their corporation statutes contain many
items of interest and some innovations that we have not
discussed above. On the whole, however, I agree ' that we
186 TELLADO, op. cit. supra note 136, at 168, 169. In Brazil the statute of
limitations is one year, but it applies only to .defects in the articles of association
not to other formalities. The Brazilian law seems unsatisfactory, not even recog-
nizing de facto corporations. AscARELi, op. cit. supra note 114, at 381 et seq.
187 Exposicion de Motivos, 3 R~asA TRim. D DzERcHo CoMERcIAL 59, 60
(1949).
188 EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERIC AND LATIN-AMERICAN
LAw 86 et seq. (1950).
189 Micou, supra note 125, at 511-4.
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have nothing to learn from Latin American legislation. On
the other hand, we can learn much from the penetrating
analysis of basic concepts and the scientific discussion of
problems in recent treatises on Ibero-American corporation
law.
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